movar.fyi

Verified on every build

Transparency

Movar makes a few promises. Each one is checked against the committed source code on every build — the same checks that drive the README badge. These are the live results.

About the network-silence check

The "nothing leaves your browser" promise is checked twice. On every commit, a scan of the extension's source looks for outgoing-network calls (fetch, XMLHttpRequest, WebSocket, sendBeacon, EventSource). On every build, the same scan runs again over the emitted bundle — dependencies and framework runtime included — and one hit fails the build. What neither catches is a call assembled dynamically at runtime, so treat this as strong evidence, not a runtime guarantee. The build also confirms the manifest declares no data collection and that no analytics dependency ships.

Why Movar can't quietly start spying on you

The checks above describe the version you have. The worry people actually raise is about the next one: an extension that behaves today and starts collecting tomorrow. That worry is well-earned — it has happened to other extensions. Here is what stands in the way, none of which is us asking you to trust us.

  1. Every line is public — and the build is reproducible

    Movar is MIT-licensed and developed in the open: every commit, every release, every review. That alone only proves the source is clean, not that the source is what you installed — so the release script builds the extension twice and fails if the two packages differ by a single byte. Anyone can rebuild a tagged commit and compare it, file hash by file hash, against the package the store served them. Firefox's reviewers do exactly that, from build instructions shipped in the repo.

    Check for yourself

  2. Movar never asks for the permission it would need to report on you

    Its manifest requests three narrow APIs: storage for your settings, alarms so a timed pause can end on its own, and declarativeNetRequest for the language preference it sends to sites. Access to the pages you visit is optional on Chrome and Firefox — you grant it during setup and can take it back. And the language rewrite is declarative: Movar hands the browser a rule and the browser applies it. Movar never sees the request, and never sees what came back.

    Check for yourself

  3. A new permission can't arrive quietly

    If a future version asked for more, your browser would stop and ask you first — this is not a courtesy the developer chooses. Chrome disables an extension outright until you accept a newly added permission warning. Firefox refuses to install the update at all and leaves the version you already have running. There is no path from "three narrow permissions" to "reads everything you type" that doesn't put a dialog on your screen.

    Check for yourself

  4. Every update is reviewed before it reaches you

    Updates arrive through the Chrome Web Store, Firefox Add-ons, and the App Store; Movar runs no update server of its own. All three review every submission, not just the first: Chrome states that plainly, and treats broad host permissions and obfuscated code as the things to look hardest at. Mozilla goes further for bundled extensions like Movar, rebuilding the add-on from submitted source and requiring the diff against the shipped package to be empty.

    Check for yourself

  5. The build turns red if the code learns to phone home

    On every commit and in CI, a check scans the extension's source for any outgoing-network call — fetch, XMLHttpRequest, WebSocket, sendBeacon, EventSource — along with any analytics dependency and the declaration that Movar collects no data. Then every build runs the same scan over the bundle it just emitted, dependencies and framework runtime included, so a request that arrived inside somebody else's package fails the build just as loudly. One hit anywhere and the build stops; it cannot be waved through by a reviewer in a hurry. Both checks are a few dozen lines you can read in a minute.

    Check for yourself

  6. There is no server on our side to change its mind

    Movar has no backend at all: no accounts, no config endpoint, no feature flags, nothing to flip. Manifest V3 also forbids extensions from loading code from anywhere else — everything Movar runs ships inside the reviewed package. So a change in behaviour cannot be a switch someone throws on a Tuesday. It has to be a public commit, a passing build, a store review, and a new version arriving on your machine.

    Check for yourself

None of this makes spying impossible in principle; nothing does, for any software you run. What it removes is every quiet path. A version of Movar that started collecting anything would have to survive a public commit, a build check written to catch it, three independent store reviews, and — the moment it needed a permission it doesn't have — a prompt on your own screen. Somewhere in that chain, you would find out.

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